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ABSTRACT
In several ways, traditional health care financing has long
been unfair to middle- and lower-income insureds. A major
problem is monopoly pricing of many services and goods.
Although the point is seldom recognized, American-style health
insurance greatly aggravates the redistributive effects of monop-
oly by weakening the usual constraints on sellers' pricing free-
dom. Moreover, lucrative monopoly is often tolerated as an
expedient instrument of public finance through which seemingly
desirable spending on health care or health-related innovation is
financed by the equivalent of an unfair head tax on individuals
with private coverage.
Other underappreciated unfairnesses are specific to
employer-sponsored health coverage and to the distorted incen-
tives and perceptions spawned by the tax subsidy encouraging it.
Because employer-sponsored coverage effectively hides premium
costs from the employee-voters who ultimately bear them, mid-
dle- and lower-income employees regularly bear the unjustifiably
high and uncontrolled costs of health coverage designed princi-
pally to accommodate the values and economic interests of the
health care industry and other elites. These same consumers
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also appear to get less, as a group, out of their employers' health
plans than their higher-income coworkers, despite bearing
equivalent premium costs.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act does little to
alter the framework of employer-sponsored coverage and thus
represents a missed opportunity to rectify its unfairness to the
working class. Although the law's main purpose is to ensure that
nearly all individuals either have employer coverage or procure
"essential health benefits" through an Exchange, it defines the
latter new entitlement in such a way as to perpetuate, not correct,
the distortions engendered by the tax subsidy. In addition, the
new law not only has no answer for the provider monopoly prob-
lem but is likely to increase wealth transfers from consumers to
providers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As if the United States needed another reason (besides lim-
ited access, high costs, and uneven quality) to embark on funda-
mental reform of its health care system, here is one: By any
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standard of social justice, far too much of the extraordinarily
high cost of U.S. health care has long fallen on lower- and mid-
dle-income payers of private health insurance premiums.' One
increasingly recognized problem is that health care prices are far
too high,2 reflecting market power obtained by health care prov-
iders despite decades of antitrust enforcement.' As this Article
will particularly demonstrate, provider monopoly is especially
burdensome for premium payers because of the way private
insurance is designed and administered in the United States.'
Another serious matter is that monopoly pricing has become
an accepted method of public finance in the health sector.
Thus, much of what most insured Americans pay for their per-
sonal health coverage has gone, like an inequitable tax, to fund
an industrial complex that, while it purports to serve public pur-
poses, is far less accountable to the "tax-paying" public than pub-
lic bodies normally are. Not only do less-than-affluent workers
have no alternative-short of going without health coverage alto-
gether-to paying this regressive "tax," but also the revenues they
contribute to the system are very often spent in ways that benefit
others far more than themselves.
Finally, virtually no health plans available to ordinary Ameri-
cans in the marketplace are designed with their specific interests
in mind. Instead, pursuant to perverse incentives, law, and cus-
tom, America's health plans embody the particular values and
serve the particular interests of the health care industry and its
most affluent customers. Especially in a time of widening
income disparities in American society, it should be unaccept-
able for insured Americans with moderate incomes to bear a dis-
proportionate share of the system's costs while also being denied
health coverage suitable for their specific circumstances. The
current deep recession only adds to the unfairness of making
people pay for health coverage that fails to take their circum-
stances into account.
1. See Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Foreword: Health Policy's
Fourth Dimension, 68 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1-2 (2006) (suggesting that
equity in the distribution of costs and benefits should be permanently added to
the short list of subtopics-i.e., access, cost, and quality-under which health
policy is conventionally discussed).
2. Gerald F. Anderson et al., It's the Prices, Stupid! Why the United States Is So
Different from Other Countries, 22 HFALTH AFF. 89, 89 (2003).
3. See Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, The Provider Monopoly
Problem in Health Care, 89 OR. L. REv. 847 (2011).
4. For further discussion of the destructive synergistic effects of monop-
oly and health insurance, see id. and Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman,
Distributive Injustice(s) in American Health Care, 69 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7,
14-20 (2006).
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While health policy commentators rarely focus on the spe-
cial burdens that the health care system imposes on less-than-
affluent insureds, they regularly and widely deplore the status of
uninsured Americans. Yet the problems of the insured and the
uninsured are two sides of the same coin, for it is mostly the high
and constantly rising cost of conventional health coverage that
has caused more and more working people to lose it. Indeed,
given the options available, it is easy to understand why large
numbers of middle-class Americans have been tempted to reject
the extortion-like demand that they either pay the industry's
high asking price for coverage (which amounts to about 19% of
the median household's total income') or put their family's
health at risk. Yet industry interests and most commentators
have focused their sympathy only on the uninsured, in the appar-
ent hope that government will bring them and the lost revenues
they represent back into the system. Easy financial access to
health care is not, however, the only indicium of fairness.' There
is nothing fair about the Hobson's choice that working Ameri-
cans have long been forced to make between paying for overly
costly health coverage and having no coverage at all. Whether
denying consumers the latter option-as the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act of 2010 ("Affordable Care Act" or
"PPACA")' undertakes to do-will make the situation any fairer
is a question reserved for later comment.
5. See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., ESTIMATED MEDIAN FAMILY
INCOMES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 (2010), www.huduser.org/datasets/il/illo/
Medians2010.pdf (reporting estimated median household income in 2010 as
$64,400); THE HENRYJ. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDuc.
TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2010 ANNUAL SURVEY 75 (2010), http://
ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2010/8085.pdf (estimating the average annual premium for
family health insurance coverage in 2010 as $13,770). We calculated the
approximate percentage by adding to median household income 70% of the
average premium-$9,773-which is the average of what employers contrib-
uted to a wage earner's employer-provided health insurance in 2010. Id.
6. For recent examples of how some commentators focus single-mindedly
on how equitably health services are distributed while neglecting to consider
where the cost burden falls, see JONATHAN COHN, SICK: THE UNTOI.D STORY OF
AMERICA's HEALTH CARE CRISIS-AND THE PEOPLE WHO PAY THE PRICE (2007)
(highlighting mostly the plight of uninsured individuals, not those who, liter-
ally, "pay the price"), and MADISON PoWERS & RUTH FADEN, SOCIALJUSTICE: THE
MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND HEALTH POLICY (2006).
7. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.,
26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter PPACA]. For ease of refer-
ence, PPACA as used here also includes amendments made to it by the Health
Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat.
1029.
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The main purpose of this Article is to call specific attention
to the many, cumulatively important regressive features of the
financing and regulatory regime that has long governed the pri-
vate side of American health care. Some matters touched upon
may seem old hat to many readers, but revisiting these features of
health policy, both individually and collectively, to determine
their cumulative distributional implications should be a sobering
experience.' Everyone associated with the health care industry is
accustomed to thinking about where its next dollars will come
from. It is time to think about where all its dollars come from
and whether both the cost burden and any offsetting benefits are
fairly distributed. Although focused principally on unfairnesses
in the entrenched, unreformed system, the Article briefly consid-
ers at the end how the PPACA generally stacks up in fairness
terms.
II. EXCESSIVE PRICEs: OVERPAYING PROVIDERS AND SUPPLIERS
Evidence that Americans pay excessive prices for health care
goods and services comes from comparisons with prices paid to
suppliers and providers in other developed nations' and with
comparable payments under the Medicare and Medicaid pro-
grams.' 0 Although the explanation for these differentials may be
simply that government-controlled health systems regularly use
their monopsony (buying) power to set prices below competitive
levels (that is, marginal costs), the substantially higher prices
observed in the United States' private sector also result from
weak competition and unchecked monopoly or market power.
Most importantly, private health insurance, at least as it operates
in the United States, greatly enhances the ability of firms with
market power to raise prices at the expense of consumers-spe-
cifically, payers of health insurance premiums. Inexplicably
neglected in the antitrust and health economics literature, this
observation has huge implications for both consumer and the
general welfare.
8. Some of the Article's observations are not fully documented here but
are supported and more fully explained elsewhere. See generally Havighurst &
Richman, supra note 4; Havighurst & Richman, supra note 3. Other points,
however, lack extensive empirical support because researchers have not focused
nearly enough attention on distributional issues.
9. See Anderson et al., supra note 2, at 90-92.
10. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MEDI-
CARE PAYMENT POLICY 54-55 (2010), http://www.medpac.gov/documents/
mar10_entirereport.pdf.
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A. Monopoly and Health Insurance: A Corrosive Combination
The economics textbook objection to monopoly is that the
high price a monopolist naturally charges tends to discourage
consumption of the monopolized good, thus diverting produc-
tive resources to other sectors and away from their best use.
Interestingly, this general misallocative effect of monopoly is not
a significant problem in health care because health insurance
enables most consumers to pay even greatly inflated prices,
which therefore do not have their usual consumption-discourag-
ing effect. By the same token, however, health insurance enables
monopolists to set prices far above what consumers would pay if
they faced those prices themselves, rather than paying only
deductibles, coinsurance, or copayments; in other words, with
health insurance in the picture, a monopolist can charge far
more than the theoretical "monopoly price."" Because insured
consumers ultimately pay these higher prices in their health
insurance premiums,12 insurance has the effect of seriously
aggravating monopoly's second objectionable effect: the redistri-
bution of wealth from consumers to producers. Although eco-
nomic theory cannot prove that one distribution of wealth is
preferable to another, the public has long objected to unjustified
monopolies precisely because of their redistributive effects.
In some ways, to be sure, private health insurers have made
price competition more effective in many health care markets by
acting as knowledgeable, aggressive purchasing agents for their
insureds and by rewarding those providers willing to grant sub-
stantial discounts from their list prices with increased patient
flow. But American insurers have little ability to confront true
monopolists for the simple reason that they are not in a position
(as individuals are, if only by necessity) to forgo purchasing a
monopolized service or product simply because its price is too
high. In the absence of a near-perfect substitute for a monopo-
lized service or product as a treatment for certain health
problems, health plan enrollees facing those problems could be
expected to protest, even bring a lawsuit, if the plan would not
purchase it for them. Although it is theoretically possible for a
health plan to obtain contractual authority to make benefit/cost
trade-offs in purchasing for the group, American health insurers
11. See, e.g., Geeta Anand, The Most Expensive Drugs: Lucrative Niches: How
Drugs for Rare Diseases Became Lifeline for Companies, WAL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2005, at
Al (quoting one drug company executive as saying, with reference to the profit-
ability of a monopoly conferred under the Orphan Drug Act, "I never dreamed
we could charge that much").
12. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
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have never sought such authority, perhaps fearing that neither
their subscribers nor the legal system would respect any econo-
mizing judgments they might make." Instead, health plans com-
pete mainly to give consumers easy access to all "medically
necessary" care, not optimal value for their health care dollars.
American-style health insurance therefore enables providers and
suppliers to parlay even marginally advantageous market posi-
tions into extraordinary monopoly profits earned at consumers'
expense.
It is impossible to identify all the health care markets and
submarkets in which health insurance facilitates extraordinary
price gouging by monopoly sellers." Antitrust enforcement has
been relatively ineffective, however. Largely because federal
judges often viewed nonprofit monopolies as relatively benign
rather than as unusually costly to consumers, the antitrust agen-
cies were unable to prevent many hospital mergers that increased
already high levels of market concentration." Similarly, the anti-
trust agencies, while suppressing most naked price fixing, have
not been able to prevent the formation of large physician groups
with substantial pricing freedom in local markets." There are
also many markets, including significant submarkets for highly
specialized services, which feature significant market power that
13. See generally CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE
CONTRACTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM (1995).
14. See generally Havighurst & Richman, supra note 3. The difficulty arises
in part because hospitals do not exercise their monopoly power simply by rais-
ing the price of each individual service for which there is no close substitute
(geographically or otherwise). Instead, they use their power over these unique
services to resist insurers' demands for steep discounts from arbitrarily set list
prices for numerous services the hospital provides. See generally Christopher P.
Tompkins, Stuart H. Altman & Efrat Eilat, The Precarious Pricing System for Hospi-
tal Services, 25 HEALTH Ave. 46 (2006) (describing how hospitals usually negoti-
ate prices not service-by-service but by agreeing to an across-the-board discount
for large bundles of services). Although hard data on hospitals' monopoly prof-
its are lacking, hospitals' revenues from private sources tend to exceed alloca-
tions of their fully distributed costs (which themselves usually exceed marginal
cost, the competitive price) by substantially greater margins than their revenues
from public sources (which generally use arbitrary fee schedules). See id. at 47.
15. See Fed. Trade Comm'n & U.S. Dep't of Justice, Improving Health
Care: A Dose of Competition, at ch. 4 (2004), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/
healthcare/040723healthcarerpt.pdf; Cory S. Capps et al., Antitrust Policy and
Hospital Mergers: Recommendations for a New Approach, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 677
(2002); Havighurst & Richman, supra note 3; Barak D. Richman, Antitrust and
Nonprofit Hospital Mergers: A Return to Basics, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 121 (2007).
16. See Thomas L. Greaney, Whither Antitrust? The Uncertain Future of Com-
petition Law in Health Care, 21 HEALTH Ave. 185, 190 (2002) ("[Tjhe federal
enforcement agencies have been slow to challenge physician or other provider
networks.").
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is uncontestable legally because it arises from regulation, patents,
technological causes, natural-monopoly conditions, effective
product differentiation, or other market circumstances. Where a
seller exercises pricing power, private health insurance-at least
the kind currently found in the United States-positively facili-
tates its translation into a major redistribution of income to prov-
iders and suppliers. The renewal of health care cost escalation in
the early 2000s, after several years of relative stability in the
1990s, resulted in part from increasing supply-side market
power.' 7 Prescription drugs and medical devices, both areas
where patents and trade names confer valuable monopoly power,
have also been important contributors to recent cost increases.
Despite its enormous impact on the prices consumers pay,
few analysts have expressly recognized how American-style health
insurance aggravates the redistributive effects of monopoly. For
example, antitrust lawyers, courts, and economists have puzzled
at length over whether nonprofit firms with market power are
any less apt to charge monopoly prices than their for-profit coun-
terparts. Yet this question fades to insignificance once one
appreciates the extraordinary pricing freedom enjoyed by any
firm selling a unique or especially desirable good or service cov-
ered by insurance."8 The harm to consumers' pocketbooks from
the interaction of monopoly and American-style health insurance
warrants a fundamental rethinking and strengthening of compe-
tition policy in the health sector.
B. Monopoly as an Instrument of Public Finance
One explanation for public toleration of widespread
monopoly in the hospital sector is that most of the extraordinary
profits that health insurance enables nonprofit hospitals to earn
in particular lines of business appear to be put to good uses in
cross-subsidizing hospital activities that the market would not
otherwise support. Indeed, many such institutions do not appear
to be earning excess profits at all because their revenues are so
promptly diverted to other uses. Yet much of the high cost of
health care in the United States reflects activities and capital
spending that industry members are able to undertake only
17. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MEDI-
CARE PAYMENT PoLICY 57 (2005), http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Mar05
EntireReport.pdf (noting that insurers' use of selective contracting "has been
limited by both hospital consolidation and consumers' reluctance to accept lim-
itations on their choice of providers"); see also Robert A. Berenson, Paul B. Gins-
burg & Nicole Kemper, Unchecked Provider Clout in California Foreshadows
Challenges to Health Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 699 (2010).
18. See generally Richman, supra note 15.
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because of the way in which health insurance facilitates monop-
oly pricing.
One kind of cost that hospitals regularly cover out of
monopoly surpluses arises when the institution's costs of provid-
ing services under Medicare or a state Medicaid program exceed
its revenue from that program. In addition, some legal and regu-
latory requirements force providers to incur costs (for example,
in emergency departments) that cannot be charged directly to
(or recovered in full from) some payer. Moreover, virtually all
major medical centers voluntarily engage extensively in profes-
sional education or medical research, much of it not remunera-
tive. Finally, despite subventions from various levels of
government, hospitals bear substantial uncompensated costs in
caring for patients without health coverage."
Many have found it easy to approve nonprofit monopolies
because, even though the surpluses they generate may be sub-
stantial, they go to defray health-related costs having some social
utility and supporting an important safety net. Presumably, how-
ever, there is a limit to the amount of resources that should be
entrusted to wealthy institutions that are essentially unaccounta-
ble to the public, either politically or in the marketplace. There
is no assurance, after all, that easily gained revenues will not be
squandered in low-priority activities, in overpaying for inputs, or
simply through managerial slack. To be sure, tax-exempt
monopolists in health care markets are committed by their cor-
porate charters, state law, and the tax code to pursuing only
"charitable" purposes (generously defined) and precluded from
conferring any but incidental benefits (broadly defined) on pri-
vate interests. Among other things, however, this means that the
large surpluses they generate in their profitable lines of business
19. See Stuart Altman, David Shactman & Efrat Eilat, Could US. Hospitals
Go the Way of US. Airlines?, 25 HFALTH AFF. 11, 14 (2006) ("[Gleneral hospitals
provide a sizable amount of uncompensated care-an average of 5.5 percent of
total general hospital costs, or about $25 billion, in 2003."); see also Bruce
Vladeck, Paying for Hospitals' Community Service, 25 HFALTH AFF. 34, 37 (2006)
(estimating that hospitals incurred "community service costs" totaling $80-95
billion in 2003). To the extent that some of these costs are recompensed
through the Medicare program (and thus do not have to be financed out of
monopoly profits earned at premium payers' expense), the burden still falls
excessively on working Americans through a somewhat regressive payroll tax.
See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 4, at 8 n.1. Most notably, of course, the
Affordable Care Act promises that thirty-plus million more individuals will soon
carry generous insurance coverage that will not only reduce hospitals' uncom-
pensated-care burdens but will also make hospitals with market power even
more profitable (at premium payers' expense). See infra Part V. For a more
extensive discussion of hospital monopolies, see Havighurst & Richman, supra
note 3.
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are trapped in the health sector and unavailable for use else-
where in the economy. Indeed, federal, state, and local tax
exemptions and the conditions therefor, combined with the
profit-enhancing effects of American-style health insurance, have
permitted hospitals over time to suck very large amounts of cash
out of the economy either to support ongoing health-related
activities or to create new health facilities or new health-sector
monopolies. This one-way flow of capital into the health sector
has built enormous enterprises that can legally use their untaxed
income and assets only for health-related activities, whatever the
economy's (or premium-paying individuals') other needs.
All of this points to the need to think of nonprofit monopoly
in the health care sector as an instrument of public finance,
administered by private institutions that are accountable to the
public in only limited ways. Although community-based gov-
erning boards, states' attorneys general, and the Internal Reve-
nue Service provide some oversight, none of these is likely to
constrain nonprofit hospitals' use of their power to charge near-
profit-maximizing prices to health insurers. Nor can they pro-
vide much assurance that hospitals' money is well spent.
C. Financing by a Regressive "Head Tax"
Although American health insurers make it possible for
health care monopolists to earn extraordinary monopoly profits,
the resulting heavy costs do not fall finally on the insurers them-
selves. Instead, they are reflected in higher premiums, which,
although paid in the first instance by employers, come ultimately
from the wages of the subset of working Americans who enjoy
employer-provided health coverage.o In this way, a myriad of
health-related activities, many of uncertain value as objects of
public finance, are paid for through what amounts to a hidden
"head tax." True to the regressive nature of such a tax, the bur-
den is distributed more or less equally across all premium payers,
irrespective of their income, wealth, or ability to pay." Few
20. Economic theory predicts, and evidence confirms, that employees
ultimately bear the cost of their employer-purchased insurance, mostly in the
form of reduced wages. See Jonathan Gruber, Health Insurance and the Labor
Market 51-62 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6562, 1998).
21. Later discussion, infra Part V.C., observes how subsidies provided in
the PPACA will cap the exposure of many consumers purchasing through
Exchanges to premium costs above a fixed amount, leaving government itself to
pick up marginal charges such as those we here characterize as a head tax.
Employees in employer-sponsored plans, however, will continue to bear indi-
rectly the cost of arguably public goods financed through provider monopolists'
overcharges.
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methods of taxation are as regressive as this. Because the burden
thus imposed on lower- and middle-income premium payers is so
large, this regressivity should be a matter of explicit public
concern.
Viewing the extraordinary profits that health care monopo-
lists can earn at the expense of premium payers as a kind of tax is
helpful in appreciating not only the distributive injustice but also
the potential for resource misallocation inherent in this method
of financing projects for the public good. In particular, the anal-
ogy invites consideration of the accountability of those imposing
the burden and spending the resulting revenue. Unlike public
taxing authorities, health industry monopolists are relatively free
to set their own prices and to decide how to use the surpluses
they generate. The ironic result is that, while American-style
health insurance obviates the usual concern that monopoly will
misallocate resources by causing monopolized goods or services
to be underproduced, it combines with the peculiar incentives
and circumstances of nonprofit, tax-exempt monopolists to gen-
erate allocative inefficiency of precisely the opposite kind-too
much of a good thing.
The extraordinary profitability of nonprofit hospitals with
market power has created large pools of corporate wealth that
can be spent or invested only to support each institution's paro-
chial purposes whatever the larger society's priorities may be. In
the current deep recession, individual premium payers could
undoubtedly find better (that is, more efficient) uses for those
resources. But in the absence of any certain way to restore com-
petition limiting the pricing freedom of powerful institutions,"
policy makers should give serious attention to revoking the valua-
ble tax exemptions these ownerless corporations currently enjoy.
Revenue from income, property, and sales taxes imposed on
these huge reservoirs of wealth not only would enable govern-
ments at all levels to reduce looming budget deficits but would
also improve the efficiency with which society allocates its newly
scarcer resources.
D. Who Bears the Costs (Enjoys the Benefits) of Innovation?
Opportunities for regressive redistribution and resource
misallocation also arise from the interaction of for-profit monop-
oly and American-style private health insurance. Once again,
insurance puts health industry monopolists in a position to cap-
ture more than ordinary monopoly profits. Particularly (though
22. For some suggestions, however, see Havighurst & Richman, supra
note 3, at 871-83.
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not exclusively) in the case of for-profit firms, the prospect of
such extraordinary profits may induce equally extraordinary
efforts to gain and keep such monopolies. Obviously, some
efforts to gain monopoly power are socially beneficial, particu-
larly those yielding technological or other innovations. But the
prospect of earning very large economic rents can also induce a
great deal of spending that has little or no social value. For
example, firms can pursue or enhance market power by unin-
formative advertising, meaningless product differentiation, lob-
bying for restrictive legislation, erecting entry barriers of other
kinds, and engaging in preemptive, duplicative, or inconsequen-
tial research and development (R&D). Indeed, it has been per-
suasively argued that, even as a general matter, monopoly's most
serious misallocative effect is likely to be, not underproduction
induced by monopoly prices, but excessive investments in seek-
ing, gaining, holding, and increasing market power.23 And in
fact there is no assurance that would-be and actual monopolists
will not dissipate a high proportion of (and perhaps even more
than) their prospective rents in such endeavors. The likelihood
of wasteful expenditures in pursuit or defense of market power is
even greater in the health sector, where health insurance dra-
matically increases the lure of monopoly profits.
To be sure, one can argue that strong incentives for health
care R&D are bound to pay large social dividends. Indeed, such
analysts as David Cutler and Frank Lichtenberg have produced
evidence that the aggregate benefits of innovation in health care
far outweigh its aggregate costs,24 and it is generally agreed that
incentives for innovation tend to be substantially suboptimal in
virtually all markets. Moreover, Darius Lackdawalla and Neeraj
Sood have shown that, at least in theory, health insurance can
23. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw 13-18 (2d ed. 2001).
24. Unfortunately, they have far less to say about marginal costs and bene-
fits, especially as consumers in different income categories (rather than econo-
mists employing assumptions about social priorities) might perceive them. See,
e.g., DAVID M. CUTLER, YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE: STRONG MEDICINE FOR
AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE SysTEM 63 (2004) ("On the basis of low-birth-weight-
infant and cardiovascular-disease-care alone ... , the benefits of medical care
are about equal to its costs."); David M. Cutler & Mark McClellan, Is Technologi-
cal Change in Medicine Worth It?, 20 HEALTH Ave. 11 (2001) (examining five new
technologies and concluding from these examples that "medical spending as a
whole is clearly worth the cost"); Frank R. Lichtenberg, Are the Benefits of Newer
Drugs Worth Their Cost? Evidence from the 1996 MEPS, 20 HEALTH Ave. 241 (2001);
Frank R. Lichtenberg, Pharmaceutical Innovation, Mortality Reduction, and Eco-
nomic Growth 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6569,
1998) (concluding that "a one-time R&D expenditure of about $15 billion sub-
sequently saves 1.6 million life-years per year, whose annual value is about $27
billion").
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create near-optimal incentives for R&D." On the other hand,
Alan Garber and his coauthors have suggested that health insur-
ance, because it permits monopolists to earn profits actually in
excess of the marginal social value of the monopolized good, ser-
vice, or technology, may encourage excessive investments in
innovation.26 Another important body of literature argues that
the lure of patent monopolies induces wasteful patent races and
other unproductive spending on getting, attacking, defending,
and inventing around patents, both valid and invalid.27
Given these complexities, this is clearly not the place to
opine on the net allocative consequences of innovation incen-
tives in health care and particularly in the pharmaceutical and
medical device sectors. It is far from obvious, however, that pros-
pects for technological innovations of even very great value to
the general public (or, say, to populations of the Third World)
can justify forcing lower- and middle-income American premium
payers to disproportionately fund the incentives needed to real-
ize them. Afortioi, because serious questions can be raised about
the net effect of American-style health insurance on incentives to
monopolize segments of the health care market, it is unfair to
make the high costs of inducing innovation part of the price that
working Americans must pay if they are to have any health
coverage.
E. Repise
The foregoing discussion makes several important observa-
tions. First, American-style private health insurance, by greatly
weakening price elasticity of demand as a constraint on monop-
oly pricing by health care providers and suppliers, facilitates the
latter's exercise of market power, producing profits substantially
exceeding (the word obscene comes to mind) the usual returns to
lawful monopoly. Second, such monopoly profits both fuel and
25. See generally Darius Lakdawalla & Neeraj Sood, Insurance and Innova-
tion in Health Care Markets (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
11602, 2005).
26. See generally Alan M. Garber, Charles I. Jones & Paul M. Romer, Insur-
ance and Incentives for Medical Innovation (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Work-
ing Paper No. 12080, 2006).
27. See, e.g., M.F. Grady &J.I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation,
78 VA. L. REv. 305 (1992) ("The defect of the system is that if multiple inventors
expend resources in competition for the patent monopoly, the benefit to soci-
ety of having the invention will be dissipated by the cost of numerous, redun-
dant, development efforts."). In the health care sector, one sees extensive
efforts to create and heavily promote relatively modest product improvements
and to differentiate brand-name products from nearly equivalent generics by
heavy investment in direct-to-consumer advertising.
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prospectively induce a great deal of health-sector spending, by
both nonprofit and for-profit firms, that society has neither
directly nor indirectly validated as appropriate uses of its scarce
resources. And, third, the burden of overpaying providers and
suppliers is imposed more or less equally, like a head tax, on all
Americans with private health coverage, thus regressively
impacting all premium payers below the high end of the income
spectrum. These observations should inspire more research and
political attention to how the burden of financing American
health care is distributed. Self-proclaimed progressives, in partic-
ular, should curb their infatuation with health care as a preemi-
nent good and concern themselves with the overall welfare of
those who pay for it.
III. EXCESSIVE COSTS: UNDERCOMPENSATING FOR
MORAL HAZARD
A much more widely noted effect of health insurance, more
familiar by far than its facilitation of providers' and suppliers'
exercise of market power, results from its general unleashing of
moral hazard-that is, the tendency of patients and providers to
spend insurers' money more freely than the patient's own. To be
sure, some higher costs are unavoidable in any pooling of finan-
cial risks and are therefore, in themselves, not a sign of ineffi-
ciency. But third-party-financed spending on health care could
be seriously welfare-reducing if payers are artificially inhibited or
precluded from taking cost-effective administrative and other
steps to counter moral hazard or if health coverage is not care-
fully designed to strike an appropriate balance between financial
protection and moral hazard's potentially heavy costs. Unfortu-
nately, health insurance in the United States generates ineffi-
ciency on both scores because custom, law, and regulation are all
systematically rigged to give moral hazard nearly full sway.
Indeed, U.S. health policy appears to be premised on the notion
that health coverage, where it exists, must entitle each insured,
subject only to cost-sharing requirements, to unlimited access to
any arguably beneficial health service that a physician is willing to
prescribe. Thus, working Americans, if they are to have any
health coverage at all, must buy a variety of it that, having been
designed according the values and interests of the health care
industry and other elite groups, allows no serious consideration
of benefit/cost tradeoffs.
The total cost burden on premium payers resulting from
overly rich entitlements is no doubt substantially larger than the
burden they bear by virtue of the regressive head tax described
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above. Here, however, an insured consumer receives services
and goods of some value in return for his extra outlay, making
the exploitation of premium payers less obvious. Moreover, trust
in the health care system and admiration for all the good it does
make it hard for many people to imagine that a systematic rip-off
may be in progress. Yet if one can accept that many might be
better off taking modest statistical risks with their family's health
in order to make mortgage payments, pay energy bills, educate
their children, or save for an uncertain retirement, then forcing
working people to pay for health care of speculative or only mar-
ginal value can reasonably be viewed as unfair." The actual mag-
nitude of the unfairness depends, of course, on valuations that
only individuals can make. But ordinary Americans are currently
forced to sacrifice far too much for the privilege of having health
coverage. Only in some respects, noted below, may the Afforda-
ble Care Act make their situation appreciably better.
A. Conceding the Benefit/Cost No Man's Land
This is not the place to explore the complex reasons why
American health plans have never had, nor even seriously
sought, the de facto and de jure authority necessary to efficiently
counteract moral hazard." But their resulting inability to with-
hold (that is, ration) coverage of any prescribed service on bene-
fit/cost grounds explains not only the special power that private
monopolists can exercise in health care markets (itself a conse-
quence of unchecked moral hazard) but also the general overu-
tilization of health services and the proliferation of extremely
costly technologies, many of only slight marginal value. Even
during the ascendancy of managed health care, health plans
were not truly in the business of administering coverage to give
subsets of premium payers good value for what they wanted to
spend. Whereas that endeavor would have required establishing
and administering mutually agreed-upon, cost-sensitive limits on
individuals' freedom to draw on the common pool of premiums,
U.S. health plans have generally adhered to the convention
28. A noted economist and physician team apparently have unexamined
moral compunctions about allowing consumers significant freedom of choice
in purchasing coverage that might entail some rationing of financing (not care
itself, it should be noted)-even with public subsidies and numerous agents
available to protect them against serious mistakes. See HENRYJ. AARON & WIL-
LAM B. SCHWARTZ, CAN WE SAY No?: THE CHALLENGE OF RATIONING HEALTH
CARE (2005). But see Daniel Shapiro, Why Even Egalitarians Should Favor Market
Health Insurance, 15 Soc. PHIL. & PoL'Y 84 (1998).
29. See generally Clark C. Havighurst, How the Health Care Revolution Fell
Short, 65 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (2002).
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requiring them to finance all care that medical professionals
deem "medically necessary." Thus, the only issues in most cover-
age disputes were efficacy and cost-effectiveness (in comparison
with other measures of equal efficacy). Any rationing of arguably
beneficial care occurred behind the scenes without the insureds'
consent, usually as a consequence of insurers' use of financial
incentives to induce providers to economize. Particularly since
managed health care suddenly fell out of political and consumer
favor in the late 1990s, U.S. health plans have conceded virtually
the entire no man's land of benefit/cost tradeoffs to the moral-
hazard enemy.
It is impossible to know the actual extent of inefficient utili-
zation resulting from uncontrolled moral hazard in American
health plans.so It has been suggested that the United States does
not greatly overuse resources because its utilization rates for
many services are comparable to those in other nations." That
comparison means little, however, without some reason to
believe that foreign systems handle the moral-hazard problem
well. (In any event, the only relevant comparison, for present
purposes at least, would be between foreign utilization rates and
consumption by insured Americans alone.) On the other hand,
numerous studies reveal heavy spending that is wasteful even by
professional standards. To be sure, such studies arguably consti-
tute only anecdotal evidence of inefficiency because they take no
account of administrative costs that would have to be incurred to
achieve a more efficient result. But one widely noted feature of
the American system provides a rock-solid basis for believing that
current U.S. spending on health care, at least for the insured
30. Amy Finkelstein estimates that the spread of health insurance from
1950 to 1990 (including the implementation of Medicare and Medicaid)
accounted for at least 40% of the dramatic increase in per capita health spend-
ing during that period. See Amy Finkelstein, The Aggregate Effects of Health Insur-
ance: Evidence from the Introduction of Medicare (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 11619, 2005). Not all of this added spending was ineffi-
cient, of course, because public and private insurance provided both valuable
financial security and subsidized access to essential health services. Neverthe-
less, the moral-hazard effect detected by Finkelstein appears substantially
greater than economists had previously detected in studies of individual behav-
ior under various insurance arrangements (for example, the RAND Health
Insurance Experiment). In contrast to the earlier studies, Finkelstein's
extended time horizon enables her to detect long-term market-wide effects
induced by the substantially reduced price resistance (i.e., steeper demand
curves) that sellers increasingly faced as generous health insurance spread.
These effects include greatly altered styles of medical practice and strong incen-
tives to create and use technologies that would fail most people's benefit/cost
test.
31. See, e.g., Anderson et al., supra note 2.
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population, is seriously inefficient: the federal tax subsidy for
employer-purchased health coverage. 2
B. How the Tax Subsidy Helps the Rich (It's Not How You
May Think)
By excluding premiums for employer-sponsored health cov-
erage from employee income subject to federal and state income
and payroll taxes, the tax subsidy has long induced employers
not to worry about efficiency in designing their employees'
health coverage. To the contrary, their principal goal became
the exploitation of a large tax loophole by making as many
health care bills as possible payable with pre-tax dollars." Thus,
in place of taxable wages, they bought their employees generous,
comprehensive coverage with minimal cost sharing. This overin-
surance, amplified by uncontrolled moral hazard, could only
exacerbate the health system's misallocation of the nation's
resources.
Among the tax subsidy's many critics, a common objection is
its greater apparent value to higher-bracket taxpayers." The
regressivity these critics discern is only apparent, not real, how-
ever, because the government must sooner or later replace any
revenue it loses through such tax expenditures;" this presuma-
bly requires taxing other income at higher progressive rates, thus
32. See CHARLES E. PHELPS, HEALTH ECONOMics 354-55 (2003) (estimat-
ing, based on empirical estimates of demand for insurance, that "employer-
group health insurance premiums would be only about 55 percent as large
today if the tax subsidy were not in effect"; "it seems possible that the health
sector would be at least 10 to 20 percent smaller without the tax subsidy for
health insurance").
33. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization
Act of 2003 extended favorable tax treatment to the funding of so-called
"health savings accounts" (HSAs) if coupled with high-deductible coverage,
thus significantly leveling the playing field of health insurance choices. Pub. L.
No. 109-173, §§ 1201-03, 117 Stat. 2066, 2469-80 (codified as amended at vari-
ous provisions of 26 U.S.C.). Unfortunately, the popularity of HSAs was due
less to their benefits in purchasing health care than to their value as a new tax
shelter for the rich (since income taxes on HSA earnings were deferred until
paid out as retirement income and payroll taxes were escaped altogether).
Although with some tweaking HSAs might in due course have caused a shift
toward more efficient health coverage, see Mark A. Hall & Clark C. Havighurst,
Reviving Managed Health Care with Health Savings Accounts, 24 HEALTH Ave. 1490
(2005), they are unlikely to yield health policy benefits under the 2010
legislation.
34. See, e.g., PowERs & FADEN, supra note 6, at 132-33.
35. See EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., TAx EXPENDITURES AND
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS: ESTIMATES FROM THE FY 2011 BUDGET 1 (2010), http://
www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/FS209_Mar1 0Bens-Rev-Loss.pdf (esti-
mating cost of the tax expenditure to be almost $177 billion in 2011).
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making the net tax effect on high-bracket taxpayers negligible.
There are, however, some indirect ways in which the tax subsidy
does substantially benefit economic elites, usually at some cost to
the less affluent. A particularly important effect has been to
make employers-rather than individual consumers or other,
more homogeneous groups-responsible for designing or select-
ing most private health coverage. Although employers can use-
fully serve as sophisticated purchasing agents for their
employees, they have interests of their own and will inevitably
make choices that benefit some employees (usually higher-
income ones) more than others. One way in which the greater
value of the tax subsidy to higher-income workers has regressive
distributional consequences is by inducing employers to prefer
coverage costlier than the average subsidized worker would
choose for himself.
An even more subtle and pernicious effect of the tax subsidy
is to make employees with health coverage far less cost-conscious,
both as consumers and as voters, than they would be if they paid
for their coverage directly. Under the illusion that their employ-
ers bear any cost of coverage that is not visibly deducted from
their wages, employees are inclined to demand generous cover-
age even when their true interests would be served by economiz-
ing."6 Similarly, the inability of consumers to see the connection
between their own pocketbooks and the macro health care
choices that others make on their behalf has consequences in
political arenas. Thus, those who make legislative and regulatory
policy can take political credit for measures ensuring seemingly
higher-quality care or more generous coverage without having to
account to consumer-voters for the cost consequences.
The tax subsidy thus provides a solid foundation both for
the health-care sector's dominant ideology and for a political
economy that works systematically against the interests of lower-
and middle-income premium payers.37 Ideologically, both indus-
try practice and regulatory policy are governed by a strong pref-
erence for more and better health care with little or no regard
for how much it costs or who bears the cost burden. Consumers
36. Only 19% of employers that offer a choice of health plans require the
employee to pay the full amount by which the cost of the choice made exceeds
the lowest-cost option. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH
RESEARCH & EDuc. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2004 ANNUAL SURVEY 63
(2004).
37. This formulation of the tax subsidy's impact and importance goes
well beyond economists' far narrower focus. See, e.g., Thomas M. Selden &
Bradley M. Gray, Tax Subsidies for Employment-Related Health Insurance: Estimates
for 2006, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1568 (2006).
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of health care, seeing no reason to question this preference, have
generally embraced it in the marketplace. Likewise, in the politi-
cal process, hiding the true cost of health coverage and health
services from the consumer-voters who ultimately bear them has
made it relatively easy for elite interests to have their preferences
honored by the government. Although special interests flex
their political muscles here as elsewhere, they are less likely to
meet resistance from consumer-voters when the regulatory
choices affect only private costs. Thus, for example, the public
generally applauds regulatory limits on the ability of health plans
to ration financing even though such regulation inevitably
increases insurance premiums. Whereas government regulation
is regularly justified on the ground that consumers are too igno-
rant to be good choosers, few have acknowledged the conse-
quences for political choices when the electorate, having been
deliberately kept in ignorance about the costs they pay, fail to
recognize that health care is an economic good.
The principal beneficiaries of policies and practices that err
consistently on the side of costlier care and uncontrolled moral
hazard are, of course, the health care industry and the twelve
million individuals it employs." Less obvious beneficiaries are
higher-income Americans, who especially prefer, even at high
cost, both the highest quality of medical care and virtually unlim-
ited health coverage. The result is a system rigged systematically
against the true interests of the political majority. Although the
amount of excessive spending cannot be estimated without know-
ing consumers' true preferences, it is certain to be substantial.
American-style health coverage thus contributes once again to a
serious overallocation of resources to the health care enterprise.
V. WHO CONSUMES WHAT ALL HAVE PAID FOR?
However one may feel about affluent Americans' routinely
enjoying somewhat more and better health care than everyone
else, it would certainly be unfair if consumption patterns varied
significantly and positively with income (rather than with health
needs alone) in situations where everyone pays the same pre-
mium for the same health coverage. Although evidence is
scarce,39 there are reasons to believe that, in American health
38. See Uwe E. Reinhardt, Resource Allocation in Health Care: The Allocation
of Lifestyles to Providers, 65 MILBANK Q. 153 (1987) (emphasizing extent to which
consumer savings from enhanced price competition and economizing choices
would come at the direct expense of industry stakeholders).
39. But see Barak D. Richman, Insurance Expansions: Do They Hurt Those
They Are Designed to Help?, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1345, 1351 (2007) (finding that even
when insurance benefits and access are constant, white and high-income indi-
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plans, higher-income employees make greater use of their cover-
age, demanding and receiving more and costlier services at plan
expense than their lower-income coworkers. Even if things more
or less even out because lower-income persons have generally
poorer health and greater health care needs, there is good rea-
son to question the general assumption that, in employee health
plans, the healthy and wealthy subsidize the less fortunate. In
fact, the subsidies may run in the opposite direction.4 o
One factor that could cause consumption patterns to be cor-
related positively with income within the same health plan is cost
sharing. Most studies of cost sharing focus only on whether it
discourages consumption of assorted health services by less afflu-
ent patients."1 A different question is the extent to which condi-
tioning eligibility for insurance coverage on patients' willingness
to make out-of-pocket payments causes lower-income partici-
pants in employee health plans to get disproportionately fewer
benefits for the premiums they pay. Intuitively, it seems likely
that the winners, once again, are those who are better able to pay
up-front fees.42 Time, transportation costs, and child-care needs
are additional greater barriers for the lower-income insured seek-
ing care.
Income-correlated disparities in the volume and quality of
health services received by participants in a single health plan
might also result if there are class differences in patient attitudes
toward certain kinds of care4 3 or if physicians take different atti-
tudes or approaches in treating different patients.44 For exam-
ple, perceiving that more-educated patients have especially high
viduals consume more of certain health services covered by insurance than
their non-white and lower income coworkers).
40. Some economists' faith in market forces is such that they might
expect income-correlated differences in utilization of the same health benefits
to be compensated for in other benefits or take-home pay. See, e.g., Mark V.
Pauly, The Tax Subsidy to Employment-based Insurance and the Distribution of Well-
Being, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 83, 83 (2006). But no one has shown the
labor market to be this efficient.
41. See, e.g., JOSEPH NEWHOUSE ET AL., FREE FOR ALL: LESSONS FROM THE
RAND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT (1993).
42. See id. at 46 (showing in a table that in a controlled setting, cost shar-
ing had noticeably greater effects on middle-income consumers than on higher-
income ones).
43. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: CUL-
TURE, RACE, AND ETHNICrIY 28-30 (2001) (revealing that higher levels of per-
ceived stigma associated with mental-health illness is one reason fewer African
Americans seek mental health care).
44. LINNEA CAPPS, UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETH-
Nic DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE (Brian D. Smedley et al. eds., 2003) (detailing
persistent patterns of racial disparities in the delivery of medical services).
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expectations concerning their health care, physicians might
strive to accommodate those expectations, providing somewhat
more or better services without regard to the patient's nominal
entitlement. Likewise, insured individuals who are more articu-
late, demanding, or adept at searching the Internet may fre-
quently get their physicians to prescribe more or better services
for them than other patients normally receive.
Although equity in employer-sponsored health plans has
received little attention from researchers, the vast body of evi-
dence on racial and income disparities in the overall distribution
of health care is at least consistent with, and sometimes appears
to support, the hypothesis that lower-income workers tend to get
less out of their health plans than they pay for. Similarly, socio-
economic status appears to correlate positively with consumption
of many plan-covered services in nations with national health
programs under which everyone has the same nominal
entitlement.45
The potential for regressive redistribution in employer-spon-
sored health plans could be minimized, it would seem, if employ-
ers generally offered their employees different plans-each
designed for a specific income group-so that each subgroup
would bear only costs reflecting its own consumption, priorities,
and circumstances. It does not appear that this regularly occurs.
Indeed, employers may pool their nonunionized employees for
purposes of health coverage precisely because the unwitting con-
tributions of lower-income workers make it cheaper for the
employer to provide the costly benefits that high-income employ-
ees particularly desire. If employee health plans do indeed oper-
ate regressively, the tax subsidy is ultimately to blame, since it
both empowers employers to make the crucial choices and hides
the true cost of coverage from the rank and file.
45. E.g., Max Exworthy et al., Evidence into Policy and Practice? Measuring the
Progress of U.S. and UK. Policies to Tackle Disparities and Inequalities in US. and
UK. Health and Health Care, 84 MILBANK Q. 75, 79 tbl.1 (2006); Norman Froh-
lich et al., Health Service Use in the Winnipeg Regional Health Authority: Variations
Across Areas in Relation to Health and Socioeconomic Status, 15 HAI'THCARE MGMT.
F. 9, 9 (2002); Anthony Scott et al., Is General Practitioner Decision Making Associ-
ated with Patient Socio-Economic Status?, 42 Soc. Sci. & MED. 35, 35-46 (1996).
Although wealthier beneficiaries also consume many covered services at higher
annual rates in the U.S. Medicare program, this evidence is inconclusive in the
present context because of these beneficiaries' greater access to Medigap and
retiree coverage.
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V. DOES THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT RECTIFY HEALTH CARE's
UNFAIRNESS TO ORDINARY AMERICANS?
In seeking to eliminate inequality in financial access to med-
ical care in the United States, the sponsors of the Affordable
Care Act presumably thought they were improving the welfare of
middle- and lower-income Americans. In some important
respects, however, they left key features of the existing system
largely untouched and thereby missed a rare opportunity to ame-
liorate the systematic unfairness to the working class that this
Article shows to be a longstanding, though generally unacknowl-
edged, characteristic of health care financing in the United
States. For a large portion of the population, the new law retains
essentially the same framework for fostering employer-sponsored
health coverage that, by hiding premium costs from those who
bear them, has long enabled industry interests and elite consum-
ers to benefit at the expense of ordinary Americans. It is an
ironic testimony to the misconceptions embedded in consumers'
minds as a result of past policy mistakes that, despite the many
ways in which employer-based coverage fails to serve their true
interests, consumer-voters seemed to attach great importance to
preserving it in the PPACA. It should be less surprising that large
employers, labor unions, health industry interest groups, and
many elite consumers favored preserving the traditional financ-
ing system.
The main purpose of health reform was, of course, to pro-
vide coverage for the uninsured. Under the scheme enacted for
this purpose, many individuals and families will soon obtain their
private coverage not through their employers but through gov-
ernment-sponsored "Exchanges." For these consumers, the
PPACA creates an entitlement to "essential health benefits." In
one demonstrable way, this new legal entitlement is fundamen-
tally ill conceived and likely to prove very costly to the nation,
unless some of the vaguely defined tools and plans for innovation
optimistically included in the legislation can effectively counter-
act hitherto inexorable cost drivers.46 In this case, to be sure,
46. Among the provisions in the PPACA designed to achieve cost savings
are section 3022, which directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
implement the "Medicare Shared Savings Program," using Accountable Care
Organizations (ACOs). PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3022, 124 Stat. 119,
395-99 (2010). ACOs, in theory, are designed to reduce fragmentation in the
delivery system, thus eliminating some costs of duplication and lack of coordi-
nation. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated the program will save
$4.9 billion between 2013-2019, but experience with ACOs is extremely limited
and any such projection of savings is highly speculative. See DAVID NEWMAN,
CONG. REsEARCH SERV., AccourABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS AND THE MEDICARE
2011] WHO PAYS? WHO BENEFITS? UNFAIRNESS IN AMERICAN IEALTH CARE 515
most of the excessive costs will not fall on premium payers, as
they do in privately designed plans, but will be borne instead by
government, which has committed itself to paying large subsidies
to ensure that, for the majority of the population purchasing
through Exchanges, premiums will not exceed some stated per-
centage of their income." But, even if the new subsidies, to be
funded in some measure by progressive taxation, redistribute
excessive health care costs more fairly than they have been dis-
tributed in the past, the failure to reform the market for
employer-sponsored coverage could leave many working Ameri-
cans no better, and probably worse, off.
The number of rank-and-file workers who will retain
employer-sponsored coverage after the PPACA becomes opera-
tive in 2014 is uncertain because employers will have the option
of paying a modest penalty for not insuring their employees and
letting them purchase subsidized coverage through an
Exchange." Since generous health benefits are popular with
workers, many employers dropping coverage might find it both
difficult and costly to adjust compensation levels to reflect the
lost benefits. Larger employers, including those with unionized
work forces," are thus likely to choose to carry on as before, pro-
viding coverage themselves. Nevertheless, to the extent that
employers do shift their lower-paid employees to the publicly
subsidized plan, the latter might experience a net improvement
SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM 18 (2010), https://www.aamc.org/download/1611
72/data/crs-acos.pdf.
Other PPACA efforts to curb health care costs are an excise tax on high-
cost plans, see infra note 51, an Independent Payment Advisory Board, which
would recommend Medicare spending reductions when Medicare cost growth
exceeds the CPI, see PPACA § 3403, 124 Stat. at 489-507, and new resources to
combat fraud and abuse, see id. §§ 6406, 6504, 6604, 124 Stat. at 769, 776, 780.
These efforts are highly aspirational, however, since (among other hopes) they
assume that Congress and other officials will fulfill pledges to remove tradi-
tional sources of cost inflation. See generally, STEPHEN ZUCKERMAN, ROBERT
WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., WHAT ARE THE PROVISIONS IN THE NEW LAW FOR CON-
TAINING COSTS AND How EFFECTIVE WILL THEY BE? (2010), http://www.rwjf.
org/files/research/67188costs.pdf.
47. PPACA § 1401, 124 Stat. at 213-20. See infra note 65 and accompany-
ing text.
48. Id. §§ 1513, 10106, 124 Stat. at 253-56, 907-11.
49. Employers with a unionized work force will not be free, of course, to
unilaterally drop their workers' coverage. Indeed, because of the perversities
introduced by the tax subsidy, unions have often prospered by negotiating
costly benefits that do not, in fact, enhance their members' welfare, and they
might well insist on maintaining employer coverage even when their members
might be better off purchasing subsidized coverage through Exchanges. See
infra note 53.
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in their welfare."o By the same token, those continuing with
employer-purchased coverage will remain subject to the unfair-
nesses observed or hypothesized in this Article.
The following discussion considers the extent to which
health care under the recent reforms is likely to remain unfair to
the working class. It will also suggest the arguable unfairness of
saddling the nation with a costly new entitlement at a time when
it cannot meet the costs of earlier ones. It would be obviously
unwise and arguably unfair to make the American people, either
as consumers or as taxpayers, spend resources on questionably or
marginally valuable (or extravagantly expensive) health care
when they and the nation as a whole face serious economic diffi-
culties and may have other, more important uses for those
resources.
A. Perpetuating the Unfairnesses Embedded in
Employer-sponsored Coverage
From the point of view of distributional fairness, the
PPACA's most fundamental error is to leave largely in place, for
anyone obtaining coverage through an employer, virtually the
same tax subsidy for health coverage that has long misshaped
both the design and perceptions of private health insurance,
mostly for the benefit of the health care industry and other spe-
cial interests and elites." For individuals remaining in the tradi-
tional system, employers will continue to construct coverage
mainly to take advantage of a tax loophole rather than to achieve
cost-effective protection against unbearable financial risks, which
is the usual objective of private insurance. Unfairness to rank-
and-file employees would only be compounded if employers
caused them to pay for costly benefits that their higher-income
coworkers particularly insist upon, whether for tax or other rea-
sons. The health care industry, of course, has long since learned
50. See infra note 65 and accompanying text. For employees with incomes
below roughly 300% of the federal poverty line, the available "premium assis-
tance credit" will be more valuable (and cost taxpayers more) than the current
exclusion of employer-sponsored insurance benefits from their taxable wages.
51. The new law does, however, impose a surtax on so-called Cadillac
health plans-that is, any with annual family premiums over $27,500-starting
in 2013. PPACA § 9001, 124 Stat. at 847-53 (as amended by the Health Care
and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1401, 124
Stat. 1029, 1059-60). This provision was controversial, partly because of its
potential effects on union-bargained benefits. Although the new tax will affect
few plans immediately, the high premium level triggering it is not indexed for
inflation or rising health care costs and therefore, if not adjusted by a future
Congress, may eventually cause some benefits to be redesigned. Moreover,
Congress is not prohibited from changing its mind.
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to exploit the uncontrolled moral hazard that overbroad, U.S.-
style health insurance inevitably entails.
Leaving employers as the primary purchasers of health cov-
erage, as retaining the tax subsidy seems to do, also means that
the full cost of coverage will remain largely hidden from the
workers who actually pay for it, mostly unknowingly in reduced
wages and other benefits. With consumers continuing to believe
that their employers bear most of the cost of their coverage,"
any preferences concerning health care that they appear to
express-whether in the workplace, the marketplace, public-
opinion polls, or the political process-will still not reliably
reflect their true economic interests. Thus, employers, union
leaders, insurers, and politicians will still be in a position to com-
pete for the approval of employees, consumers, or voters, as the
case may be, by making promises the cost of which their respec-
tive constituents will unwittingly pay." Overly costly health care
and overly rich health coverage, both mandated in many respects
by state law and regulation, much of it driven by special interests
and all of it paid for directly or indirectly by working Americans,
are once again the predictable result.
Ironically, reforming the tax subsidy itself has proved politi-
cally impossible precisely because the subsidy has so confused
consumer-voters about where their true interests lie. Indeed, as a
52. The new law provides that, for the first time, employees' W-2 forms
will show their employer's contribution to their health coverage. Id. § 9002,
124 Stat. at 853-54. It is hard to believe, however, that this disclosure will affect
many employees' beliefs concerning the incidence of those costs.
53. For a lengthy characterization of the tax subsidy's cost-hiding effect as
"the crucial moral hazard" in health care, see Havighurst, supra note 29, at
77-82. "[T]he moral hazard that matters most in health care results from the
insulation of consumers qua consumers from the cost of their health coverage,
enabling employers and the political/legal system to take costly actions without
having to account to employees/consumers/voters for their full costs." Id. at
81-82.
The design of the Affordable Care Act, with employee benefits left largely
unchanged, can be explained in part by the substantial stake that labor unions,
influential with the Democratic sponsors of the legislation, have in the old sys-
tem despite its unfairness to the rank and file. Indeed, the tax subsidy's fortui-
tous effect of letting union leaders take credit for negotiating expensive health
benefits ostensibly provided at employers' expense substantially diluted the
labor movement's interest over the years in promoting legislation establishing
national health insurance, as trade unions had successfully done in other west-
ern countries. See MARIE GOTrSCHALK, THE SHADOw WELFARE STATE: LABOR,
BUSINESS, AND THE POLITICS OF HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 42-44
(2000) (observing how, after World War II and the introduction of the tax sub-
sidy, the labor movement divided its efforts between bargaining for health ben-
efits and advocacy of national health insurance, but failing to highlight the tax
subsidy as a key explanation for the movement's priorities).
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presidential candidate, Barack Obama took advantage of this
confusion when he promised-like so many politicians before
him-not to "tax[ ] your health care benefits." 54 By the same
token, however, it is unlikely that the unpopularity of the
Obama-sponsored reforms seemingly revealed in recent opinion
polls reflects much specific public awareness of the unfairnesses
observed in this Article. Indeed, what is most regrettable about
consumers' belief that health care is, for them, mostly a free
lunch is that it invites political oversimplification of the issues,
not to say demagoguery, and thus systematic neglect of health
care's hidden costs. It is hard to imagine responsible, fairness-
restoring reform of American health care without a binding
cease-fire in the sound bite-driven partisan debate over sensitive
health care issues.
B. A Costly New Entitlement
Another principal failing of the Affordable Care Act is its
writing in stone, as a new legal entitlement, a benefit package
that itself reflects the profound market failure brought about by
the misdirected tax subsidy. Thus, in an under-scrutinized provi-
sion, the new law requires all "qualified" health plans (eligible to
be offered to individuals and small businesses through an
Exchange) to offer "essential health benefits," which must be
"equal to the scope of benefits provided under a typical employer
plan, as determined by the Secretary [following a survey of pri-
vate plans]."" This provision amounts to a sweeping statutory
embrace of a benefit package that, although seemingly validated
by consumer choice, has actually been shaped under incentives
distorted by consumer ignorance about who actually pays for
health coverage and how outrageously much it costs. Consumers
with this new statutory entitlement will thus be locked into a sys-
tem reflecting not their own preferences, values, and interests
but those of the health care industry itself and its most elite cus-
tomers. They will generally have no opportunity to purchase less
costly coverage in order to put the available resources, either
their own or society's, to what they might regard as better use.
The heralded reform legislation of 2010 therefore seems certain
to carry forward, not rectify, the consequences of the tax-subsidy-
54. See Foon Rhee, Obama, McCain Tussle on Healthcare, Bos. GLOBE POLIT-
IcAL INTELLIGENCE (Oct. 6, 2008, 4:56 PM), http://www.boston.com/news/
politics/politicalintelligence/2008/10/obama-mccaintu.html.
55. PPACA § 1302(b) (2) (A), 124 Stat. at 164. Qualified-plan benefits
may then differ only with respect to cost-sharing requirements. See infra note
57.
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induced market failure that has made American health care far
more costly than it ought to be.
Comparisons with other developed nations suggest that
excessive spending on health care in the United States already
amounts to several whole percentage points of gross domestic
product (GDP), probably more than half a trillion dollars a
year." This is obviously a very heavy burden to impose either by
stealth or by statutory mandate on working families or the nation
as a whole. But the PPACA's extension to millions of additional
Americans of an entitlement to conventionally overgenerous
health coverage opens opportunities for even more moral-haz-
ard-driven waste." To be sure, most questionable health spend-
ing yields some offsetting benefit to individuals in the form of
improved health status, reassurance, and security. But many of
these marginal benefits might reasonably be seen as an extrava-
gance by even middle-class families forced to pay for them. What
the new law declares to be "essential health benefits" are nothing
of the kind, merely artifacts of a market long rigged to satisfy
various special interests and elites.
56. See, e.g., Uwe E. Reinhardt, Peter S. Hussey & Gerald F. Anderson,
US. Health Care Spending in an International Context, 23 HEALTH AFF. 10 (2004).
See also Havighurst & Richman, supra note 4, at 11-12 n.8. Excess health care
spending in the United States was recently estimated to be $650 billion per
year, equal to nearly 5% of GDP. ERIc JENSEN & LENNY MENDONCA, NAT'L INST.
FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. FOUND., WHY AMERICA SPENDS MORE ON HEALTH CARE
(2009), http://nihcm.org/pdf/EV-jensenMendonca FINAL.pdf.
57. Although some analysts, see, e.g., Anderson et al., supra note 2, have
cited international comparisons of utilization rates to minimize concern about
overconsumption in the United States, their conclusions are largely meaning-
less because their numbers for the United States focused on consumption in
the nation as a whole, including its very large uninsured (and presumably
underserved) population. The PPACA's provision of new financial access for
this population is certain to induce new overspending. The PPACA does, how-
ever, contemplate significant cost sharing, basing its means-tested subsidies for
Exchange-purchased coverage, see infta note 65 and accompanying text, on a
plan model (designated "silver") that requires cost sharing at the equivalent of
a 30% rate. PPACA § 1402, 124 Stat. at 220-24. Because purchasers receiving
subsidies will have no incentive to choose (costlier) plans with lower cost shar-
ing, cost sharing seems certain to remain as a substantial constraint on the
spending of insurer funds-indeed, as the only cost-containment tool certain to
have a significant effect in counteracting moral hazard. On the other hand,
patients in income brackets below 250% of the federal poverty line will receive
means-tested relief from cost-sharing requirements, in an apparent attempt to
equalize consumption-discouraging effects of cost sharing across income clas-
ses. Earlier discussion observed that cost sharing in employer-sponsored health
plans may affect the ability of insureds with lower incomes to benefit from their
health insurance to the same degree as their higher-income coworkers. See
supra Part IV.
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Thus, like the tax subsidy, the new statutory entitlement to a
prescribed package of "essential" health insurance benefits will
have the effect of hiding costs from those who ultimately pay
them." In this case, however, because of the subsidies to be pro-
vided, it is taxpayers, not consumers, who are kept in relative
ignorance as to the resources they have at risk. Indeed, the
whole point of creating an entitlement is to protect future bene-
fits by reducing legislators' accountability to voting taxpayers
(through the appropriations process) for the entitlement's ongo-
ing costs. Thus, although Congress retains the power to modify
an entitlement program, it rarely does so, even when facing near-
certain fiscal calamity. Once again, the public tends to see and
value health care's benefits more clearly than it sees or worries
about paying its associated costs. To count on government's will-
ingness or ability to control costs by tinkering with the new enti-
tlement is not an obviously wise policy."
C. The New Mandate to Obtain Costly Coverage
In 2014, the Affordable Care Act will take away most con-
sumers' option of going without health insurance (or receiving
only limited benefits) in return for higher wages. At this writing,
the courts are considering the constitutionality of the new law's
individual "mandate"-that is, its imposition of substantial finan-
cial penalties on anyone who does not procure the required cov-
erage."o The issues in those constitutional challenges, however,
58. Among these costs are the opportunity costs of pursuing low-cost
plans that might be more suitable for many of the Exchange insureds yet do not
pass the regulatory muster of offering "essential" benefits. Additionally, con-
sumers lose out on the benefits of innovative low-cost plans, whose offerings do
not fit what conventional wisdom deems "essential." See Lesley H. Curtis &
Kevin A. Schulman, Overregulation in Health Care: Musings on Disruptive Innova-
tion Theory, 69 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 195 (2006); Innovation: Disruptive & Con-
structive?, 27 HEALTH Ave. 1328 (2008) (introducing Health Affairs' symposium
on disruptive innovation); see also Clark C. Havighurst, Disruptive Innovation: The
Demand Side, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1341 (2008).
59. On the Affordable Care Act's largely untested, often conjectural, pro-
visions aimed at controlling costs, see supra note 46.
60. PPACA §§ 1501-02, 10106, 124 Stat. 242-52, 907-11. As of this writ-
ing, three U.S. Courts of Appeals have held or have scheduled oral arguments
to consider the constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Meghan McCarthy, Tougher
judges, but Possible Dismissal in Cincinnati Health Law Case, NAT'L JOURNAL (May
31, 2011, 6:01 AM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/healthcare/tougher-
judges-but-possible-dismissal-in-cincinnati-health-law-case-20110530. See also
Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, No. 3:10-cv-
91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683, *29 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (declaring PPACA
unconstitutional); Virginia ex. rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768,
782 (E.D. Va. 2010) (same); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 6:10-cv-00015-
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are not the fairness questions raised in this Article, which are of
only a policy nature." But the constitutional irrelevance of fair-
ness issues does not make them go away.
Defenders of the individual mandate argue that some
insureds must be made to pay premiums that are higher than
actuarially justified so insurers can afford to comply with the new
law's requirements, including dropping all annual and lifetime
limits on outlays for a single individual, covering subscribers'
children up to the age of 26, and accepting new enrollees with
preexisting conditions. 2 To these reformers, it is entirely natu-
ral (and fair) for government, first, to use its regulatory powers to
convert private insurance (through which persons voluntarily
pool risks with others facing similar ones) into generous social
insurance (through which government forces the more fortunate
to subsidize the less fortunate) and then to compel healthy, rela-
tively wealthy subscribers to finance that social insurance by pay-
ing actuarially unfair premiums." Although this maneuver
converts premiums into a kind of taxation not provided for in
the Constitution, it clearly benefits politicians eager to gain vot-
ers' approval by committing them to future spending without
making plain what they are doing.6 4
The PPACA addresses the main fairness problem introduced
by the individual mandate by providing means-tested public sub-
sidies (as advanceable, refundable tax credits) to assist lower- and
middle-income individuals' purchase of costly mandatory cover-
nkm, 2010 WL 4860299, *14 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010) (upholding PPACA
against a constitutional challenge); Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F.
Supp. 2d 882, 893-94 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (same).
61. Some defenders of the PPACA claim to find support for its constitu-
tionality in the founders' desire to "promote the general Welfare," U.S. CONST.
pmbl., and in Congress's constitutional power to "provide for the common
Defense and general Welfare of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
Although the fairness questions raised in this Article suggest that the "welfare"
of the working class (as well as "the general Welfare") is diminished, not pro-
moted, by many of the legislation's features, there is no precedent for invoking
welfare economics to invalidate an act of Congress.
62. PPACA §§ 1001, 1101, 124 Stat. at 131, 132, 141-43.
63. The transformation of private into social insurance is also accom-
plished by requiring an insurer to treat all the insureds it enrolls through an
Exchange as a single risk pool. PPACA § 1312(c), 124 Stat. at 182.
64. For a report on how a government lawyer defending the individual
mandate argued that health insurance is "a financing mechanism," not a prod-
uct, and that government can therefore compel its purchase, see James
Taranto, Stealth Socialism, WALL STREET JOURNAL (December 17, 2010), http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704034804576025731120969862.
html. The implied claim, which would seem to raise a new constitutional ques-
tion, is that government is free to employ this "financing mechanism," instead
of direct taxes, to impose its programs' costs on consumers.
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age through the Exchanges. These subsidies mostly take the
form of limits on the percentage of household income that indi-
viduals or families in various income categories up to 400% of
the federal poverty line (FPL) will have to pay for coverage.65
The ceilings on what various families must pay seem to be set so
low as to expose government to potentially high and not easily
controllable costs. For example, households with income in the
300-400% FPL bracket are protected against paying in premiums
any more than 9.5% of their income. (Thus, a typical household
with an income of $89,400-that is, 400% of the current FPL-
would receive a "premium assistance credit" equal to the excess
of its premiums over $8,493.) Because this maximum amount of
exposure is unlikely to cover the full cost of many families' cover-
age, nearly every family entitled to some subsidy can expect the
federal government to pick up its marginal premium costs,
including amounts necessitated by the ill-conceived definition of
"essential health benefits" and by the newly mandated social-
insurance features of private coverage.
Once again, it appears, poorly designed subsidies hiding
costs from consumers purchasing private coverage will ensure
market failure. In this case, the Exchanges through which indi-
viduals and small businesses are to purchase coverage, although
they have been represented as markets relying on consumer
choice, cannot be expected to feature either effective price com-
petition or opportunities for needed innovation. Indeed, only
the minority of consumers who are ineligible for subsidies will
possess the marginal cost consciousness that is necessary if any
market is to operate efficiently, and, in any event, regulation will
preclude most possibilities for cost-saving innovation." Thus,
despite the reformers' claim that the PPACA does not amount to
a government "takeover" of health care, it seems inevitable that
future costs will have to be controlled, if at all, by government
intervention, direct or indirect. Although beyond the scope of
this Article, the fairness of making unsubsidized households,
many of them distinctly middle-class, bear the extra costs attribu-
table to the mandated benefit package and the legislation's
social-insurance features is at least debatable, as is the even more
65. PPACA § 1401, 124 Stat. at 213-20. The law also provides means-
tested relief against burdensome cost-sharing requirements. See supra note 57.
66. In particular, there will be no room for so-called disruptive innova-
tion, which would enable consumers to sacrifice some marginally valuable
health benefits in return for desired premium savings. See supra note 57.
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subjective question of the fairness to taxpayers of the reforms'
built-in inefficiencies and lavish redistributive effects. 67
D. The Provider Monopoly Problem
Still another basis for questioning the fairness of the 2010
legislation is the absence in it of any answer to the provider
monopoly problem.68 Indeed, the new law compounds the prob
lem both by expanding the population of premium payers that
providers with market power can readily exploit and by removing
the many newly insured individuals as candidates to receive
uncompensated care-the provision of which has long given
many provider monopolies, especially those possessed by non-
profit hospitals, at least a plausible raison d'etre. Thus, the new
law will enable providers with market power to exact even greater
tolls-from premium payers in the case of employer-sponsored
insurance and from government in cases where it bears the mar-
ginal cost of coverage.
Wealthy providers, particularly tax-exempt hospitals, will
therefore soon have even greater surpluses with which to
advance their corporate objectives. No matter how socially
worthwhile their spending of these surpluses may seem, hospi-
tals' discretionary spending should not be financed either by the
equivalent of a regressive head tax on consumers with employer-
sponsored insurance or by open-ended taxpayer-financed entitle-
ments for lower- and middle-income insureds. Wasteful spend-
ing is simply too likely because there are no mechanisms in
place-either market or political-to ensure that hospitals' sur-
pluses are put to society's or individuals' most highly valued uses.
The new law also limits what health plans can spend on
administration, even though such "administrative" costs
67. Whether or not the subsidies themselves are justified, some of their
cost will be distributed in an arguably fair way through progressive taxation. A
portion, however, is to be covered through special taxes on hospitals, pharma-
ceutical companies, and insurers, see PPACA §§ 9007-08, 9010, 124 Stat. at
855-62, 865-68, all of whom stand to benefit greatly from the influx of newly
insured patients and may be in a position to pass their new tax burden back to
employer-sponsored health plans, exacerbating existing unfairness.
68. See generally Berenson et al., supra note 17; Havighurst & Richman,
supra note 3.
69. PPACA § 9016, 124 Stat. at 872 (providing for a minimum "medical
loss ratio"). Although insurers may limit their provider networks and will there-
fore sometimes be in a position to bargain for lower prices, those health plans
offered through Exchanges are required to "ensure a sufficient choice of prov-
iders," which might make it difficult to exclude a dominant provider of an
important service. Id. § 1311(c) (1) (B), 124 Stat. at 174. To be sure, this
requirement is explicitly not meant to require contracting with a provider that
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include efforts to frustrate monopolists' price gouging and to
counteract moral hazard. Moreover, providers are already using
new provisions designed to foster the creation of so-called
"accountable care organizations"o as an excuse for integrating
with competitors, further weakening the ability of private payers
to negotiate for lower prices." Redistribution of wealth from
consumers to providers, already an unrecognized scandal
because of the ubiquity of provider market power and its special
toxicity when combined with U.S.-style health insurance, seems
likely only to worsen under the new regime.
VI. CONCLUSION: TREATING THE WORKING CLASS AND
TAXPAYERS FAIRLY
Perhaps it is not too late to call policymakers' attention to
the fundamental unfairness to the working class of the United
States' dominant system of health care financing, to regret the
opportunity missed in 2010, and to rectify this unfairness
through major reform legislation. To be sure, a mandate requir-
ing people to insure themselves (rather than exploiting the sys-
tem's charitable impulses without paying a fair share of its costs)
would not itself be unfair. But it is certainly unfair to maintain or
create conditions that cause working people to spend their own
money for health coverage that may be richer than is appropriate
for their personal circumstances. These hardships for persons
'refuses to accept the [plan's] generally applicable payment rates." Id.
§ 1311(c)(2), 124 Stat. at 174. Nevertheless, a monopolist might be able to
demand both an increase in such rates and price protection under a most-
favored-nation clause. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 3, at 856-57,
871-81 (citing reports documenting such monopolists' demands and sug-
gesting antitrust and regulatory measures that might give competing health
plans significant leverage even against providers possessing monopolies in sig-
nificant submarkets).
70. PPACA §§ 3022, 10307, 124 Stat. at 395-99, 940-41.
71. See Robert Pear, Health Law Provision Raises Antitrust Concerns, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 8, 2011, at A19. See also AM.'s HEALTH INS. PLANS, AccourNABLE
CARE ORGANIZATIONS AND MARKET POWER ISSUES (2010), http://
www.americanhealthsolution.org/assets/Uploads/Blog/ACO-White-Paper.pdf;
Berenson et al., supra note 17, at 699 (noting ACOs' "potential not only to pro-
duce higher quality at lower cost but also to exacerbate the trend toward
greater provider market power"); Jeff Goldsmith, Analyzing Shifts in Economic
Risks to Providers in Proposed Payment and Delivery System Reforms, 29 HEALTH AFF.
1299, 1304 (2010) ("Whether the savings from better care coordination for
Medicare patients will be offset by much higher costs to private insurers of a
seemingly inevitable . . . wave of provider consolidation remains to be seen.");
Thomas L. Greaney, The Affordable Care Act and Competition Policy: Antidote or Pla-
cebo?, 89 OR. L. REv. 811 (2011); Havighurst & Richman, supra note 3, at
871-76.
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whose incomes have for some time been steadily falling further
behind the more fortunate few can only cause special pain in the
current recession-which is not guaranteed to end before 2014,
when the Affordable Care Act will add even more to working
families' cost burdens.7 ' Although the means-tested subsidies
provided by the Act will mitigate some of the unfairnesses inher-
ent in the overall system, they raise important policy questions of
other kinds, even including their potential for triggering
national bankruptcy.
In a perfect political world, awareness of the fairness and
other issues identified in this Article would trigger a constructive
bipartisan effort to replace the individual mandate with tax-sys-
tem changes yielding both strong incentives for consumers to
carry basic health insurance and new reasons and opportunities
to economize in purchasing it.7 ' Formulating such a proposal
would also give even ideologically divided politicians opportuni-
ties to agree on measures to rectify other distributional unfair-
nesses, including those resulting from over-regulation of the
health sector both by legislative and administrative measures and
by the tort liability system.74 Interestingly, if such a proposal
could be drafted, it might stand a chance of actually succeeding
in the 112th Congress. At the least, it would put defenders of the
2010 law-including President Obama himself if Congress were
72. Because health insurance premiums are relatively fixed and mostly
get paid ahead of other household expenses, the health care industry has itself
been relatively recession-proof-with the result that job insecurity for workers
in the rest of the economy has been proportionally greater, thus adding yet
another unrecognized unfairness to those already noted in this Article.
73. The proposal might contemplate, first, inclusion of the actuarial
value of each employee's employer-paid health coverage in his income subject
to income and payroll taxes and, second (to offset this new tax burden), offer-
ing a fixed, refundable tax credit to anyone having at least basic health insur-
ance. Competing insurers should then be freed, with some regulatory
oversight, to design, offer, and responsibly administer innovative coverage for
consumers seeking good value for whatever they or their employers choose to
spend. Ideally, insurers could come up with respectable products meeting truly
essential needs while costing little or no more than the tax credit to which eve-
ryone would be potentially entitled. Requiring coverage to be portable and
automatically renewable at actuarially fair prices would go far toward reducing,
over time, the uninsurable population, the immediate needs of which should
be met through public expenditure.
74. For a showing of "how industry practice, public policy, health care
law, and government regulation are all structured at the most fundamental
levels to ensure that ... regressive allocation of benefits and costs remains the
pattern in U.S. health care," see Havighurst & Richman, supra note 4, at 50-71
(including examples of specific unfairnesses crying out for reform). The
PPACA does little to correct this "pattern" while creating new unfairnesses of its
own.
526 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 25
to embrace the proposal-in the position of having to decide
whether to accept the proffered alternative or instead to bet the
ranch on both a favorable Supreme Court ruling on the law's
constitutionality and the outcome of the 2012 elections.
Unfortunately, this very small window could be responsible
legislators' last, best opportunity to craft a bipartisan, fundamen-
tally fair, truly "affordable," and near-universal system of health
care financing for the American people. Although regulatory
tinkering and tweaking of the framework created by the PPACA
may be able to ameliorate some of its problems, the more likely
outcome is that the nation will shortly be left with the worst of
both worlds: on the one hand, a private insurance market that
lacks both the requisite incentives and legal room for competing
health plans to counteract powerful cost drivers in the interest of
their customers and, on the other hand, regulatory and redistrib-
utive mechanisms that are incapable of compensating effectively,
sensitively, and fairly for the absence of reliable market forces.
In general, it is hardly fair to the American people, particularly
given their current circumstances, to force them to spend huge
resources for which they have other, more immediate needs on
marginally or questionably valuable, overpriced health care.
